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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the cooperative relaying communication, the system has to defend itself against the 
eavesdropper which may undermines the message integrity by sending the modified messages. 
We propose a physical layer integrity check scheme for cooperative relaying communication, 
where a source broadcast the signals to both destination target and an untrustworthy relay node. 
The approach exploits physical layer signals in detecting the modified messages conducted by 
the relay. We develop a scheme that utilizes a few cryptography information in the initial 
message packets to estimate the optimal detecting threshold. By applying the optimal detecting 
method, the proposed approach achieves almost same performance provided by perfect 
cryptography strategy that can detect all the modified messages but with high computational 
cost caused by applying cryptographic encryption to all the transmitted messages. 
 
Keywords—physical layer, integrity check; modified messages; cryptography; optimal 
detecting threshold.  
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
  With rapidly developing of wireless networks and signal processing techniques, the 
cooperative relaying communication [1] has been widely applied to many scenarios such as 
distributed sensors and cooperative nodes group [2] [3]. It has gained considerable attention in 
the literatures as a promising next generation wireless network [4].  
  Because of its inherent vulnerable nature, it is easy for eavesdropper to monitor the 
signals in the transmit path or intercept the messages. Thus substantial researches have been 
conducted to develop the techniques to guarantee the security requirement. And many physical 
layer approaches with lower computation cost and less protocol overhead [5] have been 
developed [6]. However, because of the highly development of cryptography algorithm, little 
attention has been paid to the integrity issues such as ‘Man In the Middle attack’ or malicious 
relay disruption [7], especially less researches have been conducted to exploit the physical 
layer property to accomplish the integrity check. In general, the advanced cryptographic 
algorithm requires more computation resource, so it is hard to apply to wireless networks where 
the destination nodes are resource constrained [8]. In this Thesis, instead of achieving security 
by merely transmitting highly encrypted messages [9] which consume a lot computational 
resource, we proposed a scheme that exploits the physical layer signals in detecting messages 
modification conducted by relay. Our results shows by applying optimal detecting threshold 
method, the proposed approach can achieves almost same performance provided by perfect 
cryptography strategy that can remove all the modified messages from relay.  
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1.2 Thesis organization 
 This thesis is organized as follows, chapter 2 describes the system model been 
investigated, where source transmit messages to destination target. But due to channel poor 
quality between them, source also broadcast the signal to a near relay node and Let node help 
relaying the message to destination target. However since the relay is untrustworthy, it may 
forward modified messages to the destination to undermine the information integrity. And we 
analyze the error probability of system model based on the different detection results. In 
chapter 3, we proposed an optimal detection method to detect the modified messages in the 
physical layer by exploiting the hamming distance [10] property between channel codewords. 
This is followed with the theoretical analysis for applying optimal detecting threshold. Since 
the calculation of optimal detecting threshold requires the pre-knowledge of the attack 
probability, a cryptography-aided estimation strategy of attack probability is developed. The 
numerical results and conclusions are in chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively. 
  
3 
CHAPTER 2 
 THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION 
 
2.1  Problem statement 
 In cooperative relaying communication, the source transmitter broadcasts the message 
to the destination target. Sometimes the destination target is far away from the source 
transmitter or there are obstacles standing between them, these all will cause the channel gain 
decreasing significantly [11]. If the destination only decodes the message based on the signal 
overheard from the source, the probability of decoding error would is high. In order to avoid 
this situation, the source would choose a relay node [12] and also broadcasts the signals to it. 
Since the channel gain between relay and destination is efficiently high, relay will re-transmit 
the signals to the destination and destination can combine both identical signals together to 
decode the message. However, the source cannot guarantee all the relays in networks are 
trustworthy, so there is a high chance that relay node will modify the original message from 
source and sends another different message to the destination. If destination decodes the 
message based on modified signals, the probability of decoding error is much higher than just 
decoding signal from the source even if source-to-destination channel quality is poor. Thus 
destination has to check the message integrity by applying some detection techniques. Ideally 
this goal can be achieved if we encrypt all the messages by advanced cryptography, but 
compared with physical layer detection method, the computational cost of cryptography is 
much higher, so it is valuable to develop an approach in physical layer. 
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2.2  System model 
 The system model being investigated is shown in Fig. 1. We consider the situation that 
source wishes to send message to the destination, but the channel quality between is poor due 
to the long distance between. So source transmitter also broadcasts signals to an untrustworthy 
relay and relay forward it to the destination. The 𝑆𝑆 is the Source broadcaster, 𝑅𝑅 represents 
intermediate Relay and 𝐷𝐷  is Destination receiver. For simplicity, the system uses BPSK 
modulation mode. 
 Here 𝑆𝑆 is designed based on the channel BCH (n, k) code [13], one of CEC (Cyclic 
Error-Correcting) channel code [14], let 𝑡𝑡 denotes the CEC channel code’s self-correct ability, 
it is to say if the erroneous bits in codeword is less than 𝑡𝑡 bits, if could be automatically 
corrected. 
  In the first phase, 𝑆𝑆 encodes the k-bits length original message 𝑚𝑚 into an n-bits length 
codeword  𝑋𝑋 , then broadcast 𝑋𝑋  to relay and destination simultaneously. In phase 2, relay 
retransmit  𝑋𝑋 to 𝐷𝐷, and we assume relay always receives 𝑋𝑋 from source correctly because of 
the short distance between them. Last phase destination generates the decoded codeword 𝑋𝑋� 
based on the signals received from relay and destination. And the decoded message 𝑚𝑚�  can be 
obtained by passing 𝑋𝑋� through the BCH decoder. 
 
Figure 1. The cooperative relaying model 
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 As the we discussed in the chapter 2.1, the untrustworthy relay holds malicious 
intension, it may modifies 𝑋𝑋 into another codeword 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 with probability 𝛼𝛼. Let 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 = ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋 +
𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 be the signal received from source and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 = ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 + 𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 be the signal received from the 
relay. Where ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠~𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2) and ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠~𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2) represent the channel fading coefficients 
respectively. Because the channel quality of relay-to-destination is better compared with the 
channel quality of source-to-destination, usually channel gain 𝜎𝜎12 < 𝜎𝜎22 , 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 and 𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟  are the 
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the variance 𝑁𝑁0, the transmit SNR is 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏/𝑁𝑁0.  
 We already know if system decodes message based on modified codeword 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟  and 
original codeword 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠, the probability of decoding error is efficiently high. In next section we 
describe the physical layer method that detects the integrity of 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 , and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟  is discarded if 
detection determines it contains the modified 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟, Otherwise 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 are combined together 
by applying the MRC [15] (Maximal-ratio combining) rule to improve the received SNR 
(signal noise ratio).  
 
2.3  The detection method 
 Since source encodes the message by using BCH (n, k) code, let 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 +
𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟  denote two k-bits length vector corresponding to the source’s 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠  and relay’s  𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 
respectively. Where " + "  represents XOR operation and 𝐹𝐹  is the modification vector 
generated by relay. 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 and 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 are just “random error vector” represent Gaussian noise 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 and 
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 respectively. 
 In general, 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 must be a valid codeword in the designed BCH (n, k) codebook, or 
it will be abandoned as corrupt codeword due to the invalidity of channel code. Furthermore 
the relay should chooses the most similar codeword to original one. Since the noise exists, the 
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more similarity between 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 and 𝑋𝑋, the lower chance 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 will be detected as a modified 
codeword.   
 So based on discussion above, define 𝑊𝑊(𝑋𝑋) be the hamming weight (the total bit 1s in 
binary vector) calculation function of 𝑋𝑋 . The relay’s “behavior” can described as below: 
 Relay may modifies the original codeword 𝑋𝑋 into another valid codeword 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 with 
the probability 𝛼𝛼. And𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹) = 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹 ≠ 0, where 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the minimal hamming distance 
between two codewords. Let: 
 𝐻𝐻0 denotes the event that relay not modify 𝑋𝑋, so 𝐹𝐹 = 0.  
𝐻𝐻1 denotes the event that relay does modify 𝑋𝑋, so 𝐹𝐹 ≠ 0. 
 So we construct a hypothesis test [16] that compares the hamming distance between 
codeword 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 sent by source and 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 sent by relay, if the hamming distance is no 
less than some threshold 𝛿𝛿, we decide there is an attack and reject event 𝐻𝐻0, otherwise accept 
event 𝐻𝐻0: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
0
ˆ
ˆ
:  
:  
s r
s r
H W X E X F E
H W X E X F E
δ
δ
 + + + + ≥ 
 + + + + < 
    (1) 
if we assume 𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠+𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟, then (1) equivalents to 
 
( )
( )
1
0
ˆ
ˆ
:  
:  
H W F E
H W F E
δ
δ
+ ≥
+ <
      (2) 
 Under 𝐻𝐻�0 , destination combines 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠  and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟  using MRC rule to increase the received 
SNR; under  𝐻𝐻�1, the relay’s 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 is discarded and the message is decoded based on 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 only.  
 Next section, we derive the decoding error based on the different detection results, for 
convince, the notation symbols used in the derivation is listed in appendix A. 
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2.4  The probability of decoding error 
 In chapter 2.3, we know detection determine whether to combine 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 with 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 or not. If 
detection result is  𝐻𝐻�1 , the message only is decoded based on 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 ; otherwise destination 
combines 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 using MRC rule to decode the message. Thus the average probability of 
decoding error can be expressed as:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Pr
| | , , | , ,
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
m m
P m m H P H P m m H H P H H P m m H H P H H
≠
= ≠ + ≠ + ≠
  
  (3) 
the three terms in (3) actually represent three condition decoding errors, from left to the right 
in (3) are ordered by: decoding error of modification decision; decoding error of correct 
detection and decoding error of miss detection.  
 And we assume the system uses BPSK modulation mode, from [17] let  
 
1 1
2 1
1 1
2 1
s
s
s
r
r
r
e
e
γ
γ
γ
γ
 
 = −
 + 
 
 = −
 + 
      (4) 
denote the bit error probability in the source-to-destination channel and  the relay-to-
destination channel respectively, where 
 
2 2
s
0 0
2 2
r
0 0
E(| | )
E(| | )
b b
s sd
b b
r rd
h
N N
h
N N
ε εγ σ
ε εγ σ
= =
= =
      (5) 
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are the average received SNR respectively. Then the probability 𝑒𝑒 of a bit in vector 𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠+𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 
is 1 is given by 
 ( ) ( )1 1 2s r s r s r s re e e e e e e e e= − + − + −=      (6) 
 Next section we derive the decoding error of modification decision, the decoding error 
of correct detection and the decoding error of miss detection respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Decoding error of modification decision 
 Given 𝐻𝐻�1, 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 is discarded and the message is decoded based the 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 only. Since the bit 
error probability (before decoding) of the source-to-destination channel is 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠  and error 
correction ability 
is 𝑡𝑡, the probability of decoding error is given by 
 ( ) ( )1
1
| 1ˆˆ
n
n ii
s s
i t
n
P m m H e e
i
−
= +
 
≠ = − 
 
∑      (7) 
the probability of deciding 𝐻𝐻�1 is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,P H P H H P H H= +      (8) 
where (probability of false alarm) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 0 0 0, | 1 1ˆ
n
n ii
i
n
P H H P H P W E H e e
iδ
δ α −
=
 
= ≥ = − − 
 
∑        (9) 
and (probability of modification detection) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1, |ˆ |P H H P H P W F E H P W F E Hδ α δ= + ≥ = + ≥     (10) 
 Let 𝐽𝐽 denote the number of the 1’s in 𝐹𝐹 that are changed by 𝐸𝐸, so its probability mass 
function is given by 
9 
 ( ) ( )1 , 0mind jmin j min
d
P J j e e j d
j
− 
= = − ≤ ≤ 
 
    (11) 
 In order to get 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸) ≥ 𝛿𝛿, we need at least (𝛿𝛿 − 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐽𝐽) 1’s in the other 
positions (not the position where in 𝐹𝐹 is 1) of 𝐸𝐸. However there are two special condition:  
 If 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐽𝐽) ≤ 0, then 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸) ≥ 𝛿𝛿 already satisfied. The value of equation 
(11) equals to 1. 
 If 𝛿𝛿 − (𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐽𝐽) > 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, then 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸) < 𝛿𝛿 can’t be achieved. The value of 
equation (11) equals to 0. 
so we obtain: 
 ( )( )
( )
( )
1, 
0,   
|
.1 ,
min
min
min
n d
n d Lmin L
L d J
J n
J n
P W F E J
n d
e e
L
OW
δ
δ
δ
δ
−
− −
= − −
≤ −
 > −+ ≥ = 
 −  −   
∑
 (12) 
Combine equation (7) and (10), the (9) equals to 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1
0
ˆ , |
mind
j
P H H P W F E J j P J jα δ
=
= + ≥ = =∑   (13) 
Therefore it follows from (7) (8) (9)and (12) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
1
0
ˆ| 1ˆ
1 1
ˆ
|
min
n
n ii
s s
i t
dn
n ii
i j
n
P m m H P H e e
i
n
e e P W F E J j P J j
iδ
α α δ
−
= +
−
= =
  
≠ = −  
  
  
× − − + + ≥ = =  
  
∑
∑ ∑
    (14) 
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2.4.2 Decoding error of correct detection 
Given (𝐻𝐻�0,𝐻𝐻0) which is the ideal situation for communication system and the message 
is decoded based on the MRC combining of 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 (unmodified). The bit error probability 
𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 of MRC combining of 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 is given by (26) in the Appendix A. 
Therefore the probability of decoding error is 
 ( ) ( )0 0
1
ˆ | 1ˆ ,
n
n ii
m m
i t
n
P m m H H e e
i
−
= +
 
≠ = − 
 
∑     (15) 
Since 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 1 0, 1  , 1 1 1ˆ ˆ
n
n ii
i
n
P H H P H H e e
iδ
α α −
=
  
= − − = − − −  
  
∑        
(16) 
We obtain 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0
1
| , ,
1 1 1
ˆ
1
ˆ ˆ
n n
n i n ii i
m m
i t i
P m m H H P H H
n n
e e e e
i iδ
α− −
= + =
≠
      
= − − − −      
      
∑ ∑
             (17) 
 
2.4.3 Decoding error of miss detection 
The (𝐻𝐻�0,𝐻𝐻1) (miss detection) is the worst case, the bit error probability 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚′  of MRC 
combining of 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 is given by (29) in the Appendix B 
Therefore the probability of decoding error is 
 ( ) ( )' '0 1
1
| ,ˆˆ 1
n n ii
m m
i t
n
P m m H H e e
i
−
= +
 
≠ = − 
 
∑     (18) 
Since 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 1 1
0
,  , 1 |ˆ ˆ
mind
J
j
P H H P H H P W F E J j P J jα α δ
=
 
= − = − + ≥ = = 
 
∑    (19) 
We obtain 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 1 0 1
' '
1 0
ˆ ˆ,
1 |
ˆ | ,
1
mindn n ii
m m
i t j
P m m H H P H H
n
e e P W F E J j P J j
i
α δ
−
= + =
≠
   
= − − + ≥ = =   
    
∑ ∑
       (20) 
The Pr(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) (average probability of decoding error) can be obtained by applying (14) 
(17) and (20) into equation (3). Since 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚′  are the constant parameters which can 
be calculated based the transmit SNR, 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑘𝑘 are designed by the BCH code, the Pr(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) 
is a function of the attack probability 𝛼𝛼  and detection threshold 𝛿𝛿 . Next chapter we will 
describe the proposed optimal detection method that minimize the average probability of the 
decoding error.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION 
 
3.1  Optimal detection threshold 
 Since the goal of optimal detection is to minimize the Pr(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) (average probability 
of decoding error). And from the analysis in the chapter 2, we know Pr(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) is a function 
of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛿𝛿, Then it is equivalent to find the optimal threshold 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) which satisfies: 
 ( ) ( )arg    ˆPropt min m mδδ α ≡ ≠      (21) 
 So given a specific value of attack probability  𝛼𝛼 , the 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) can be obtained by 
exhaust search: changing 𝛿𝛿 from 0 to 𝑛𝑛 and find the one that minimize the average probability 
of decoding error.  
 Fig. 2 illustrates the 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) versus 𝛼𝛼. And we compare situations 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 5𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 with 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 20𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.  
 
Figure 2. Optimal threshold versus attack probability 
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 It can be seen that the optimal threshold keep unchanged in certain range around attack 
probability. And higher attack probability produces a lower optimal detecting threshold value. 
Furthermore it can be observed that the optimal threshold becomes very robust against attack 
probability when transmit SNR achieve high level.  
 In conclusion, because 𝛼𝛼 is a secret only known to relay and 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) depends on 𝛼𝛼, it 
is necessary to estimate 𝛼𝛼 in finding optimal detecting threshold scheme, especially in the low 
transmit SNR case.  
 
3.2  Crypto-aided estimation of attack probability 
 Since estimating the attack probability can help calculate the optimal detecting 
threshold, so we proposed a scheme that utilizes a few cryptographic [18] encrypted codewords 
in initial 𝑁𝑁  codewords, which it used as the training reference to help estimating attack 
probability. Then use 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼� ) to substitute 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) as the optimal threshold value for optimal 
detecting method.  
 
 
Figure 3. The codewords forwarded by source transmitter 
 
 As shown in Fig. 3, suppose source transmitter encrypt total number of 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 codewords 
by cryptography [19], and distributes these 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 codewords randomly into initial number of 𝑁𝑁 
codewords. We assume only source transmitter and destination know where those 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 
14 
encrypted codewords locate. Thus destination can directly know if these 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 codewords are 
modified or not once it receives first 𝑁𝑁 codewords.  
 Take the timeliness issue into consideration, 𝑁𝑁  usually be a small number (for 
example 𝑁𝑁 < 20). Furthermore, set 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 ≪ 𝑁𝑁 (for example 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 2~6) to reduce computation 
cost caused by cryptographic encryption.    
 The first step depicted in Fig. 4, destination check those 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  codewords and record the 
cryptographic outcomes in 𝐶𝐶. Where 𝐶𝐶 is a length-𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  indicator vector whose element is 1 if 
the corresponding codeword is modified, otherwise it is 0.  
 
 
Figure 4. Cryptography check for encrypted codewords 
 
 
 Second step illustrated in Fig. 5, apply physical layer detection method to those 
𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  codewords. After compute the hamming weight 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸)  in (2), then record these 
hamming distance values in 𝐻𝐻. Where 𝐻𝐻 is a length-𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  indicator vector whose element is the 
value of hamming weight 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸). 
 Then compare 𝐻𝐻 with threshold 𝜂𝜂 to complete physical layer detection and record the 
detection results in 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 . Where 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 is a length-𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  indicator vector whose element is 1 if the 
detected codeword is determined been modified, otherwise it is 0. Vary 𝜂𝜂  from 0 to 𝑛𝑛  to 
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complete the vectors set {𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2 …𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚}.  
 
 
Figure 5. Physical layer detection for encrypted codewords 
 
 The third step, we calculate the hamming distance between vector 𝐶𝐶  and {𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2 …𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚} and choose the ?̂?𝛿 satisfies 
 ( ){ }0arg   ˆ     nmin W C Cη ηδ ≤ ≤= +      (22) 
 In case there are multiple ?̂?𝛿 satisfy equation (22), depending on the situation, if the miss 
detection loss is more severe than false alarm does, system can choose the smallest 𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 to 
minimize the miss detection rate [19]. Otherwise choose the biggest ?̂?𝛿 to minimize the false 
alarm rate.  
 Final step is drawn in Fig .6, apply physical layer detection to those 𝑁𝑁 − 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 
unencrypted codewords with 𝛿𝛿 = ?̂?𝛿  in equation (2) and record the detection results in 𝐷𝐷 . 
Where 𝐷𝐷 is a length-𝑁𝑁 − 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐  indicator vector whose element is 1 if the detected codeword is 
determined been modified, otherwise it is 0.  
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Figure 6. Physical layer detection for unencrypted codewords 
 
Then calculate 𝛼𝛼� by 
 
( ) ( )ˆ   W D W C
N
α
+
≡       (23) 
Thus 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼� ) can be obtained by equation (19).  
 
3.3 Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process 
 In chapter 3.1 we discuss optimal detecting threshold and in chapter 3.2 we develop a 
scheme to estimate the attack probability which is necessary to calculate the optimal detection 
threshold. In this section we describe our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process 
as shown in Fig. 7. 
 After receive the signals from source transmitter and relay, destination first subtract 
initial 𝑁𝑁 codewords and utilizes the 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 encrypted codewords information to estimate the attack 
probability 𝛼𝛼. Then the estimation 𝛼𝛼� can be used as pre-knowledge to produce the optimal 
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detection threshold  𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼� ) . Next step, destination applies 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼� )  to the physical layer 
detection processor to detect the all the other unencrypted codewords. If the detection shows 
codewords is modified, it will be discarded; otherwise destination will combine both codeword 
by using MRC rule to decode the message. 
 
 
Figure 7. Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process 
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CHAPTER 4 
 NUMERITICAL RESULTS 
 
 This chapter will first analyze the proposed optimal detection scheme performance 
based on the different detection threshold value and compare them for several different attack 
probability cases. Then investigating the estimation of attack probability performance provided 
by the proposed algorithm. Finally we will show the simulation results of the cooperative 
relaying system by applying our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check technique. 
 
4.1  Probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold 
 We will first analyze the proposed optimal detection scheme performance. Analytical 
results for probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold is shown in Fig.8. Let  𝛼𝛼 =0.3 , 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5 , 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1 , and use BCH (15, 7) code. Compare the situations where 
transmit 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 10𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 15𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 20𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 . It can be observed that when the detecting threshold 
approaches to the optimal value, the error probability decreases significantly.  In the view of 
SNR aspect, when SNR increases, the optimal threshold value and the decoded error rate both 
decrease.  
 And in Fig. 9, we compare the probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold 
given different relay’s attack probability scenarios, where 𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7.  Let  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5 , 
𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟
2 = 1, transmit 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 15𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. BCH (15, 7) code and use BCH (15, 7) code. It can be seen 
that as relay’s attack probability decreases, the probability of decoding error and optimal 
detecting threshold both decrease due to less modification codewords received. 
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Figure 8. Probability of decoding error 𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) versus detecting threshold 𝛿𝛿;  𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1. BCH (15, 7) code 
 
   
 
Figure. 9 Probability of decoding error 𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚� ≠ 𝑚𝑚) versus detecting threshold 𝛿𝛿;  
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠
2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 15𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. BCH (15, 7) code 
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4.2  Attack probability estimation versus transmit SNR 
 This section we investigate the performance of our estimated attack probability. Fig. 
10 shows the attack probability estimation simulation performance. Let 𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1,  𝑁𝑁 =20, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 3, and use BCH (15, 7) code. We compare the situations where channel gain 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 =0.01,0.1,0.5. It can be seen that 𝛼𝛼� produced by proposed scheme varies around 𝛼𝛼 in a small 
range even when the channel gain of source-to-destination become very small.  
 
Figure. 10 Attack probability estimation versus transmit SNR  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1,  𝑁𝑁 = 20, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 3. BCH (15, 7) code 
 
4.3  Optimal detecting threshold and proposed optimal threshold estimation  
 The optimal detecting threshold has been analyzed in chapter 3.1 and the proposed 
optimal is described in chapter 3.2. The Fig. 11 shows simulation comparison results between 
optimal detecting threshold and proposed optimal detecting threshold estimation versus relay’s 
attack probability. BCH (15, 7) code, Let  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5 , 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1 ,  𝑁𝑁 = 20 , 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 3 , transmit 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 10𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 and use BCH (15, 7) code. Since 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) keep robust in a small range around 𝛼𝛼 
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as shown in Fig. 2, it can be seen the corresponding 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼�) produced by proposed scheme is 
very close to 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼) . The only divergence exists in the special situation, where  𝛼𝛼 = 0 . 
Because when there is no modified codewords, destination should always accept the signal 
from the relay, thus the analytical optimal threshold achieves a large value. Since we choose 
the scheme that minimizes the miss detection rate in simulations, it tends overestimates the 𝛼𝛼 
and produces a smaller value of 𝛿𝛿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼� ) . Furthermore it can be observed that the optimal 
detecting threshold is robust against relay’s attack probability especially in high SNR. For 
another special situation where 𝛼𝛼 = 1, both analytical and proposed scheme estimation of 
optimal threshold converge to 0 that system always discard codewords from relay.  
 
Figure. 11 Comparison of optimal detecting threshold with proposed optimal detecting 
threshold estimation. 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1,  𝑁𝑁 = 20, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 3. 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 10𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. BCH (15, 7) code 
 
4.4  False alarm rate and miss detection rate 
 We investigate the how false alarm rate and miss detection rate varies against threshold 
closed by destination in the section. Fig. 12 shows the analytical results for False Alarm rate 
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and Miss Detection rate versus detecting threshold with 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, transmit 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 10𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 and use BCH (15, 7) code. It is straightforward to see that the false alarm rate 
diminishes as threshold approaches to the maximum value and meanwhile the miss detection 
rate gets to the minimum value.  
 
Figure. 12 Probability of false alarm and miss detection versus detecting threshold; 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 10𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. BCH (15, 7) code 
 
 
Figure. 13 Probability of false alarm and miss detection versus transmit SNR; 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1. BCH (15, 7) code  
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Then in Fig. 13 we show the analytical results of False Alarm rate and miss detection 
rate versus transmit SNR applied with the optimal threshold. Let 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 
and use BCH (15, 7) code. Overall, both false alarm rate and miss detection rate decrease with 
SNR increases. But there exists several “change” points in both curves, it is because the optimal 
threshold changes a smaller value when SNR achieves the efficient high level (as shown in 
Fig.8). And a smaller optimal threshold produces a higher false alarm rate and a lower miss 
detection rate. 
 
4.5  Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check 
 This section we show the simulation results of cooperative relaying system 
performance by applying our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check technique.  
 
Figure. 14 Probability of decoding error comparison between simulations and analysis; 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑁𝑁 = 20. BCH (15, 7) code 
Fig. 14 shows the simulations and analytical results comparison for the probability of 
decoding error versus transmit SNR. Let 𝛼𝛼 = 0.3,𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1 and use BCH (15, 7) code. 
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It can be observed that our simulations matches with analysis. 
Since the Fig. 14 shows our simulation process matches with analysis.  Fig. 15 depicts 
the simulation results for the probability of decoding error versus transmit SNR. Let 𝛼𝛼 =0.3,𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑁𝑁 = 20, and use BCH (15, 7) code. We compare the proposed scheme 
with different  𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 0,2,4,6 . It can be observed that the proposed estimation scheme’s 
performance is almost as good as the ideal cryptography scheme where destination can always 
remove the modified codewords. And with the proportion of 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐/𝑁𝑁 becomes larger, proposed 
scheme curve converges to cryptography’s. Moreover, if system applies no detecting 
techniques, the performance cannot be improved by increasing the transmit SNR. That is lose 
caused by the modification conducted by the relay.  
 
Figure. 15 Probability of decoding error versus transmit SNR I for different Nc; 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑁𝑁 = 20. BCH (15, 7) code 
Fig. 16 shows the simulation results for probability of versus transmit SNR given 
several attack probability 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1, 0.3,0.5. Set 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1, 𝑁𝑁 = 20, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 2, and use 
25 
BCH (15, 7) code. It can be seen that the probability of decoding error increases when 𝛼𝛼 
become larger, this is because when more modified codewords received, the more messages 
have to be decoded based on source information only or the modified codewords sent by relays. 
 
Figure. 16 Probability of decoding error versus transmit SNR II for different attack 
probability; 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 = 1,  𝑁𝑁 = 20, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 3. BCH (15, 7) code 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We investigate a scenario in cooperative relaying communication where source 
transmitter broadcasts the signals to destination and relay, and relay re-transmits the signals to 
destination. Since the relaying node is not trustworthy, instead of helping source, it may 
forward the modified signals to attack the destination. So the destination has to do the detection 
to decide whether the signals from relay if modified or not. Based on the detection results, the 
destination may discard the signals from the relay and only decodes based on the signal from 
the source, otherwise both signals are combined together by using the maximum ration 
combining rule to decode the message. In analysis we show that by applying the optimal 
detection threshold method, the average probability of decoding error can be minimized.  
However the optimal detection threshold calculation requires the pre-knowledge of the relay’s 
attack probability. 
Since the optimal threshold value is robust against the relay’s attack probability in a 
certain range around and with transmit SNR increases it tend to keep unchanged. Thus we 
proposed a scheme to estimate the attack probability that utilizes this property. And our results 
show that the performance provided by optimal threshold based on the proposed cryptography-
aided scheme estimation achieves a good performance as the perfect cryptography strategy. 
Even though perfect cryptography strategy can detect all the modified messages, it consumes 
a significant high computational resource to apply cryptographic encryption to all the 
transmitted messages. 
Furthermore since the optimal threshold value is very robust against the relay’s attack 
in high SNR, the can be used for a long duration to achieve the high efficiency in practice. It 
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is unnecessary to refresh estimated optimal threshold value frequently; furthermore the total 
amount cryptography computation cost in the proposed scheme can be very small so that it can 
be easily applied to the resource-constrained distributed wireless network system. 
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APPENDIX A 
NOTATION 
 
Symbol Meaning 
 
𝒎𝒎 
 
Original message 
 
𝒎𝒎�  
 
Decoded message 
 
𝒌𝒌 
 
Length of message 
 
𝑿𝑿 
 
The BCH codeword for message 𝑚𝑚 
 
𝑿𝑿� 
 
The BCH codeword for decoded message 𝑚𝑚�  
 
𝒏𝒏 
 
 
The length of the BCH codeword 
 +  XOR operation 
 
𝑾𝑾(𝑿𝑿)  Hamming weight of 𝑋𝑋  
 
𝒅𝒅𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒏𝒏 
 
The minimal hamming distance in  BCH code  
 
𝒕𝒕 
 
The BCH code self-correct ability 
 
𝑬𝑬𝒔𝒔 
 
Random noise vector represents Ns 
 
𝑬𝑬𝒓𝒓 
 
Random noise vector represents Nr 
 
𝑬𝑬 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 + 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 
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𝑭𝑭 
 
Relay’s modification vector 
 
𝑱𝑱 
 
number of the 1’s in 𝐹𝐹 been reversed by 𝐸𝐸 
 
𝒆𝒆𝒔𝒔 
 
probability that single bit in vector 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 is 1     
 
𝒆𝒆𝒓𝒓 
 
probability that single bit in vector 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 is 1        
 
𝒆𝒆 
 
probability that single bit in vector 𝐸𝐸 is 1     
 
𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒎 
 
the error rate by applying MRC rule to 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟  
 
𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒎
′
 
 
the error rate by applying MRC rule to 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟  
 
𝝈𝝈𝒔𝒔
𝟐𝟐 
 
Channel gain of source-to-destination 
 
𝝈𝝈𝒓𝒓
𝟐𝟐 
 
Channel gain of relay-to-destination 
 
𝜹𝜹 
 
Threshold of detection method 
 
𝜶𝜶 
 
The relay’s attack probability 
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APPENDIX B  
PROBAILITY OF MRC COMBINING  
 
In this section we derive the expression of 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚  and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚′ . Since the transmit SNR is 
𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏/𝑁𝑁0 , and ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠~𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎s2)  and ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠~𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎r2) ,  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 < 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟2 . So |ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|2 and |ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠|2   has chi-
square probability distribution with two degrees of freedom. And system uses the BPSK 
modulation.  
 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 is the probability of decoding error by applying MRC to 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟, where 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 is not 
modified. From [17] we know the error rate is 𝑄𝑄(�2𝛾𝛾1), where received SNR 𝛾𝛾1 is 
 ( )2 21
0
| | brd sdh h N
εγ = +       (24) 
define 𝑍𝑍 = |ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠|2 + |ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|2, Then the PDF of 𝑍𝑍 is 
 ( ) ( )
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     (25) 
Then the expression for 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 is 
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r s2 2
r s
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m z
b b
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r s
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   + +−      
∫
  
 (26) 
 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 ′ is the probability of decoding error by applying MRC to 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 and 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟, but 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 contains 
the modified codewords. Because the relay does not change all the bits in codeword, so the 
unchanged bit keep the same error rate as 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 . The error rate for the modified bit will 
be 𝑄𝑄(�2𝛾𝛾2), where 𝛾𝛾2 
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 ( )2 22
0
| | brd sdh h N
εγ −=        (27) 
define 𝑍𝑍 = |ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠|2 − |ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠|2, The PDF of 𝑍𝑍 is 
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Then the expression for 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚′  is 
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